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The knowledge-capital model of the multinational enterprise incorporates in
one framework two types of foreign direct investment. On one side, there is
the horizontal type of FDI, which corresponds to the market seeking motiva-
tion. Usually, it is to a foreign direct investment in a high-income country,
whose market is of interest to the multinational corporation. Multinationals
prefer to serve the foreign market with local production, in order to avoid the
costs associated with international trade. On the other side, there is the cost
reduction motive, which corresponds to the vertical FDI. This type of foreign
investment is usually directed to low-income countries, whose markets are less
interesting for the multinational enterprise. The aim of this investment is to
exploit the comparative advantages of the countries in the production of goods:
lower production costs attract part of the production process of multinationals.1
Recently, several papers have proven that also the institutional environment
of the receiving country can explain FDI in￿ ows. First, a good institutional
environment raises productivity, which in turn attracts FDI. Secondly, poor
institutions are an additional cost to foreign direct investments, and, ￿nally, a
foreign direct investment is vulnerable to uncertainty, due to high sunk costs.
All these factors suggest that a good institutional environment in the recipient
country is preferred by multinational companies.
The novelty of this paper is that I prove that institutions matter di⁄erentially
across di⁄erent sectors. Contracts literature suggests that contract enforcement
impacts di⁄erentially across sectors, being more important in those sectors that
produce more complex goods. Thus, the institutional environment of a country
does not impact in the same way on multinationals￿ s decision of o⁄shoring, but
it will be more relevant for those sectors that produce more complex goods.
These are the sectors that rely more heavily on contract enforcement.
The aim of the present work is to show how institutional quality, and com-
plexity of goods can explain the ￿ ows of intra-￿rm trade between U.S. multi-
nationals and their foreign a¢ liates. I ￿nd, indeed, that institutional charac-
teristics of the country and the industry positively a⁄ect trade ￿ ows between
U.S. companies and their a¢ liates. In the analysis, I exploit several measures
of intra-￿rm trade ￿ ows. First, I consider the sum of total intra-￿rm trade
￿ ows, running in both directions. Then, I employ separately trade ￿ ows from
1For an overview on multinationals and foreign direct investments, see Barba Navaretti
and Venables (2004).
2U.S. parent companies to foreign a¢ liates, and vice versa. Finally, I exploit the
di⁄erence between good shipped for simple resale in the foreign market, and
goods shipped for further manufacturing. I show that the suggested argument
is stronger for the intermediate products, while the evidence is weak for those
products ready for sale. This con￿rms that the contractual determinants of
trade are not at work in the case of ￿nal goods.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on contacts and international fragmentation of production. Section 3
outlines the empirical model, Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 deals some
econometric issues and presents the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Quality, Contracts and O⁄shoring
Several papers have underlined how the choice of starting a foreign direct invest-
ment can depend also on the quality of the institutions of the receiving country.
Wei (2000) ￿nds that inward ￿ ows of foreign direct investments are reduced
by high levels of corruption in the recipient country. Globerman and Shapiro
(2002, 2003) suggest that institutional quality has a positive impact both on
inward and outward FDI, while Aizenman and Spiegel (2002) demonstrate that
the share of FDI is decreasing in corruption levels.
BØnassy-QuØrØ, Coupet and Mayer (2007) estimate a gravity equation for
bilateral FDI stocks that includes institutional quality measures for the two
countries, and ￿nd that the measures of institutional quality are both positive
and signi￿cant. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2005) ￿nd that institu-
tional quality, as instrumented by its historical determinants, is an important
determinant of capital ￿ ows, de￿ned as FDI plus portfolio equity. Using a data
set that covers the period 1970-2000, they demonstrate that the Lucas￿paradox
(1990) may be explained by di⁄erences in institutional quality. The institutional
environment explains also capital volatility: lower levels of institutional quality
implies higher capital volatility.
The Grossman-Hart-Moore model has given inspiration to a number of paper
in international trade literature, which have been focusing on the boundaries
of the ￿rm, and the choice between outsourcing and internalization. McLaren
(2000) considers the choice made by the ￿nal good producer and the input
supplier located in the same country, between arm￿ s-length production and in-
tegrated procurement. In equilibrium, thickness of the market favours outsourc-
3ing. Grossman and Helpman (2002) model the choice between integration and
outsourcing, in a closed economy framework. The mode of organization is deter-
mined in equilibrium by the trade o⁄ between the costs of running a larger and
less specialized organization and the costs of imperfect contracting and search
frictions. Grossman and Helpman (2005) present a monopolistic competition
model in which ￿rms outsource part of their production, and choose between
outsourcing at home or abroad. They show that an improvement of contract
enforcement in a country raises the relative pro￿tability of outsourcing there. In
another paper (2003), they consider ￿rms that acquire their inputs from another
country, where production is cheaper. The authors neglect the determination
of the location of component production, and focus on the choice between out-
sourcing and FDI. The ￿rms choose in this model between outsourcing in the
foreign country and foreign direct investment. This choice depends on industry
size, contracting environment and relative wages. Ottaviano and Turrini (2003)
consider the choice of the multinational to serve a foreign market with exports
or foreign direct investment. If FDI is chosen, the ￿rm chooses also between
self-production and outsourcing of intermediate inputs. Their model predicts
non linearities between FDI and trade costs: foreign direct investments may
emerge with both low and high trade costs. Ornelas and Turner (2005) consider
the ￿rm￿ s choice between a standardized intermediate input produced at home,
or a customized input produced abroad. They focus on the e⁄ect of a trade
liberalization in a model with contact incompleteness, and show that it may
prompt vertical integration.
All these models assume that hold up occurs only between the supplier of
the intermediate input and the ￿nal producer. Antr￿s instead follows the works
of Grossman, Hart and Moore (1986, 1990) and allows for the possibility of hold
up also within ￿rm boundaries. In his model (2003) he builds a property-rights
model of the boundaries of the ￿rm. He predicts that costs of outsourcing are
increasing in the capital intensity of the imported good, thus, capital-intensive
goods will be produced within the ￿rm. He provides empirical evidence that
U.S. intra-￿rm trade takes place mostly in capital-intensive sectors, with capital
abundant countries. Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) combine the within sectorial
heterogeneity modelled by Melitz (2003) with the model of the ￿rm bound-
aries developed by Antr￿s (2003) and focus on the choice between integration
or arm￿ s length relationship for the production of intermediate inputs, both at
home and abroad. The ￿rm faces two di⁄erent decisions: the ￿rst is whether
to produce a component at home, or in foreign country. The second is whether
4to produce within ￿rm boundaries, or outside it, with an arm￿ s length contract.
According to productivity and sectorial characteristics, four di⁄erent organiza-
tional forms exist in equilibrium. This model endogenizes both outsourcing and
location decision. In a subsequent paper (2006), they allow for varying degrees
of contractibility across inputs and countries, adopting the incomplete contracts
formulation developed in Acemoglu, Antr￿s, Helpman (2007). They ￿nd that
an increase in the contractibility of inputs has di⁄erent e⁄ects, depending on
the country in which it takes place: an improvement in institutions in the ￿nal-
good producer￿ s country encourages outsourcing, while an improvement in the
institutions of the supplier￿ s country encourages integration.
Few empirical works exist in this stream of literature, mainly due to data
limitations. Feenstra and Hanson (2005) look at processing imports and ex-
ports in China, with data at HS 8-digits level. They possess information on
the ownership structure, and ￿nd that the allocation of ownership and control
is generally shared between foreign and local parties. Swenson (2005) focuses
on the determinants of outsourcing abroad. Using data on the o⁄shore assem-
bly program (OAP) of the Unites States, she shows that outsourcing activity
is responsive to country￿ s costs and industry characteristics. Using a rich data
set on U.S. ￿rms, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) show that multinationals
have a constant breakdown of trade between intra-￿rm and arms￿length trans-
action, which equally cover the trade ￿ ows of multinationals. Moreover, also
the share of exclusively arm￿ s-length exporters or importers has remained sub-
stantially stable over the period considered.2 Using the same database, Nunn
and Tre￿ er (2007) test empirically the predictions of Antr￿s (2003) and Antr￿s
Helpman (2004, 2006). Their test of Antr￿s Helpman (2006) is closest in spirit
to the subsequent analysis, although they control if the relative prevalence of
vertical integration over outsourcing depends on industries contractibility, coun-
tries institutional quality and headquarter intensity. Given their focus on the
model, they neglect in their analysis controls for the standard determinants of
o⁄shoring, and they do not exploit the information on the intended use of the
shipped good.
2Their newly created data set has also ￿rm level information on the amount of goods
exchanged through arm￿ s length relationships.
53 The Empirical Model
A huge bulk of theoretical literature has shown how contractual imperfections
determine the choice of the ￿rm between production in house or subcontracting,
either at home or abroad. I do not inspect the determinants of these choices,
instead I focus on multinationals and the organization of production within
them. Multinational enterprises split the production process between parent
company and a¢ liates located in other countries. The focus of the analysis is
the o⁄shoring of production. I consider only those goods whose production takes
place entirely within multinational boundaries, although in di⁄erent countries.
Thus, production has been o⁄shored, but not outsourced. Of course, part of
the production may have been outsourced too, unfortunately, I do not possess
any information on the entity of the outsourcing activity implemented. There-
fore, I limit my analysis to the ￿ ows of goods that are produced in house. I
analyse the impact that institutions have on the organization of production
within multinational ￿rm boundaries.
The hypothesis that I want to test is that institutional quality of the country
of the a¢ liate a⁄ects the production choice of the multinational ￿rm. Follow-
ing the Grossman-Hart-Moore framework, and, more recently, Antr￿s (2003),
I suppose that hold-up concerns exist also within an integrated ￿rm. As the
risk of hold-up is present, I expect that the fragmentation of production will
be favoured in countries that present a better contract enforcement. There-
fore, institutional quality matters for organization of production within ￿rm
boundaries, with better contract enforcement in the a¢ liate country favouring
o⁄shoring within ￿rm boundaries.3
Acemoglu, Antr￿s, Helpman (2007), Costinot (2005), Levchenko (2007) and
Nunn (2007) have shown that a poor contracting environment impacts di⁄er-
entially across sectors, being more detrimental to sectors that produce more
complex goods. In other words, a good enforcement of contracts is a source of
comparative advantage in the production of those goods that require a large
number of intermediate inputs, and consequently a large number of contracts
with several input suppliers, in order to be produced.
Given the choice of the ￿rm to produce abroad through an FDI, I expect
that good contract enforcement in the host country favours o⁄shoring of pro-
3This is close to Antr￿s Helpman (2006) prediction that an improvement in the contractibil-
ity of an input provided by a foreign supplier encourages integration in face of o⁄shore out-
sourcing.
6duction in more contract-dependent sectors. More institutionally dependent
goods will be produced preferentially with a¢ liates located in countries with
good institutional quality.
Of course, testing the institutions hypothesis, I have to control for the stan-
dard determinants of o⁄shoring of production. Two di⁄erent reasons may moti-
vate foreign direct investments. The ￿rst is the market access motive, which cor-
responds to the horizontal type of foreign direct investment. The second is the
cost reduction motive, that pushes multinationals to fragment their production
in order to reap cost gains, which corresponds to the vertical FDI framework.
The knowledge capital model shows that these two forms can coexist. Han-
son, Mataloni and Slaughter (2001) provide empirical evidence that nowadays
multinationals￿expansion strategies have both vertical and horizontal features.
Accordingly, I have to consider both types of determinants together.
The horizontal motive can be tested with country characteristics, industry
characteristics and trade costs measures. In order to test the vertical motive,
I have to consider that costs vary across countries and industries according to
comparative advantage. I enrich the standard test of the vertical FDI, consid-
ering institutional quality as an additional source of comparative advantage in
the production of complex goods. This is a safe assumption, as several authors4
have already demonstrated that institutional quality can be a source of com-
parative advantage in the production of more complex goods, which require a
large number of contracts in order to be produced. The aim of the empirical
analysis is thus to test whether the institutional comparative advantage matters
in multinational choices of production.
I estimate the following equation:
flowict = ￿ + instict + horict + verict + "ict
where i is the sector, c the country and t the time period. horict corresponds
to a set of variables that determine the choice to establish an horizontal direct
investment abroad, verict is a set of measures of production costs, which vary
across countries and sectors and instict is a measure of the institutional quality
driven comparative advantage. I use intra-￿rm trade ￿ ows as a measure of the
o⁄shoring activity by multinationals.
4Costinot (2005), Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007), Acemoglu Antr￿s Helpman (2007).
74 The Data
The data used in the analysis come from the data set on U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad, maintained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce. I employ di⁄erent measures of sales between nonbank U.S.
multinationals and theirs majority-owned nonbank a¢ liates. These are enter-
prises in which the U.S. entity has at least a 51% equity stake. I use data from
the benchmark surveys in years 1994 and 1999. Although data on direct invest-
ment abroad are available for every year, only benchmark surveys contain the
information on the intended use of the good traded, namely the choice between
further manufacturing or resale.5
As dependent variable I consider in turn several measures on intra-￿rm trade
￿ ows. First, I use the value of total intra-￿rm trade, which I obtain summing
trade ￿ ows running in both directions. Then, I inspect separately trade ￿ ows
of goods from foreign a¢ liates to parent companies6 and trade ￿ ows from U.S.
parents to foreign a¢ liates. Finally, I exploit the distinction between goods
shipped for further manufacturing and good shipped for resale. Unfortunately,
this information is available only for trade ￿ ows to foreign a¢ liates.7
Institutional dependence at industry level, insti, is measured with Nunn￿ s
(2007) measure of contract intensity.8 In the robustness section, I show that
the results hold also using Her￿ndahl index as proxy for product complexity.9
I compute these indicators using the U.S. Input-Output Table for 199210 and
for 1999. I am assuming that the existing structure of intermediate inputs use
in the United States is driven by technology di⁄erences across sectors, and that
these technological di⁄erences carry over to the other countries.
Measures of institutional quality, instc, are taken from the Governance Mat-
ters IV Database (Kaufmann et al. 2005). This data set, maintained by the
World Bank, provides six di⁄erent indexes of institutional quality, that range
from -2.5 (poor quality) to 2.5 (good quality)11. These indicators focus on
di⁄erent aspects of institutional quality: Voice and Accountability, Political In-
stability and Violence, Government E⁄ectiveness, Regulatory Burden, Rule of
Law, which refers speci￿cally to the level of contract enforcement, and Con-
5See Appendix A.1 for further information on data issues.
6This measure has been employed also in Yeaple (2003).
7Another attempt to exploit the information on the intended use is Yeaple (2006).
8See Appendix A.2 for more details on how the measure is constructed.
9This measure has been employed by Levchenko (2007).
10US Input-Output table for 1994 is not available.
11These indexes have mean zero and a standard deviation of 1.
8trol of Corruption. These measures are based on a large number of individual
variables, which measure the perceptions of governance. Also these measures
are normalized between 0 and 1, with larger values corresponding to better in-
stitutional quality. For a description of the variables, see Appendix A.3 Table
1 shows the correlations between di⁄erent measures of institutional quality at
country level. All correlations are positive and signi￿cant at 1% level. Then,
multiplying instc and insti, I obtain a measure of institutional dependence that
is country and industry speci￿c.
I assume that there are no factor intensity reversals, thus implying that factor
shares are ￿xed for each industry across countries. Therefore, factor intensities
can be ranked using factor share data for just one country. I use U.S. industry
data for reasons of availability, moreover they are the most satisfactory, as the
United States are the largest and most diverse industrial economy. Data for
factor intensities come from the U.S. Manufacturing database maintained by
NBER and U.S. Census Bureau￿ s Center for Economic Studies for 1994 and
1996.12 capitali is a measure of capital intensity, and is equal to one minus
the share of total compensation in value added. skilli is a measure of skilled
labour intensity, and is equal to the ratio of non production workers to total
employment, multiplied by the total share of labour in value added.
I test the relevance of comparative advantage in intra-￿rm ￿ ows by an in-
teraction of factor intensities and relative factor prices.13 To determine relative
factor prices I use relative factor abundance, taken from Hall and Jones (1999).
The abundance of skilled labour skillc is measured by the human capital to
labor ratio, which is based on the education levels reported in Barro and Lee
(2000). The abundance of capital capitalc is measured by the investment based
measure of the capital to labor ratio, sourced from Hall and Jones (1999).
I add a set of variables to control for the classical determinants of FDI. In
order to control for the horizontal motive for foreign direct investment, I include
a measure of market size, namely the log of GDP in current U.S. dollars, taken
from the World Development Indicators. The measures for tari⁄s are taken from
the CEPII tari⁄s data set. Tari⁄s are measured at the bilateral industry-level
in percentages. NTBs are classi￿ed following Haveman￿ s (2003) treatment of
TRAINS. I include a measure of transport cost, (freight plus insurance) taken
from the Feenstra World Trade Flows Dataset. I add some measures of scale,
in order to test the horizontal FDI hypothesis. I build a measure of plant level
12Data for 1999 are not available, I used data for 1996 as it is the most recent year available.
13This choice re￿ects the test of comparative advantages developed by Romalis (2004).
9scale economies as the number of production workers per establishment. It is the
average size of a plant in the U.S. by industry, that gives a measure of plant-level
￿xed costs. The variable corp:scale is a measure of corporate scale economies,
and is the average number of non production workers per company.14 Finally,
I control for ￿scal regime in the foreign country, using several proxies taken
from the World Development Indicators. Following the literature, I consider
the highest marginal corporate tax rate, which is the highest rate shown on the
schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations.15
5 Econometric Analysis
5.1 The Choice of Estimation Technique
The dependent variable, flowict, assumes only positive values and is not contin-
uous, moreover it presents a large number of zero observations. Using Shapiro-
Francia test for normality, I ￿nd that all di⁄erent measures of trade ￿ ows are
not normally distributed, nor are their logarithmic transformations. Given the
distribution of my dependent variable, I may refer to the family of count data
models. Several reasons suggest that this could be the optimal choice. First,
the dependent variable is integer, and does not have a continuous distribution.
Moreover, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2005) suggest that the widely adopted
log-linearization of the dependent variable, estimated by OLS, produces incon-
sistent estimates in presence of heteroskedasticity.
Among count data models, Poisson regression model16 is the ￿rst choice.
Poisson distribution requires that mean and variance assume the same value for
the dependent variable. This is often di¢ cult to ￿nd in the data, therefore in
this cases the solution is to move to the negative binomial regression model,
that allows mean and variance to di⁄er. Alternatively, another way to treat
overdispersion is to consider models that take into account the overrepresenta-
tion of zeros in the sample: these are the zero in￿ ated Poisson model and the
zero in￿ ated negative binomial model.
A quick look at summary statistics of the di⁄erent dependent variables con-
sidered in the analysis is presented in Table 2. It shows that all these di⁄erent
measures of trade ￿ ows present overdispersion. Figure 1 shows the plot of the
14Data come from the 1992 Census of Manufacturers and 1997 Manifacturing Economic
Census.
15Results are robust also controlling for the role of value added tax.
16This is a common choice when using this data set on intra-￿rm trade, see Yeaple (2006).
10probabilities observed, and the probabilities predicted by the di⁄erent models
considered.17 The graph shows that Poisson model is unable to predict correctly
the observed distribution. The other distributions seem to ￿t better our data,
especially negative binomial regression and zero in￿ ated negative binomial re-
gression. This qualitative analysis suggests the use of a negative binomial or a
zero in￿ ated negative binomial regressor. Among these, Long and Freese (2005)
suggest that negative binomial is to be preferred as it is simpler.18
In order to choose, I estimate the simplest equation of interest using di⁄erent
estimation techniques, then I perform a number of test in order to choose the
correct estimator. Table 3 shows the results of the regression of the total intra-
￿rm ￿ ows on the interacted term between institutional quality at country level,
and institutional dependence at industry level. First, I observe that the coe¢ -
cient of interest is always positive and signi￿cant, across di⁄erent regressions.
Moreover, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is rather stable. In order to compare
these non-nested model, I look at the Bayesian Information Criterion. It would
suggest that the Negative Binomial Regression is the one that captures better
the nature of the data. This con￿rms the qualitative analysis of the distributions
represented in Figure 1, in which negative binomial and zero-in￿ ated negative
binomial seem the two speci￿cations to be preferred. I obtain analogous results
observing the Akaike￿ s information criteria.
To properly determine the correct regressor, I perform a number of tests.
A goodness-of-￿t test for the Poisson speci￿cation is implemented: the statistic
rejects the hypothesis that data are Poisson distributed. A Vuong test of ZIP
versus standard Poisson gives a positive and signi￿cant statistic, thus favouring
the ZIP model. Although ZIP does not seem to perform well looking at BIC
statistics, it is nevertheless to be preferred to the standard Poisson estimator.
The reason is that including the zero in￿ ation process is a way to take into
account the overdispersion present in the data. Anyway, as overdispersion is a
problem in the data, negative binomial is to be preferred. The likelihood ratio
test of ￿, the overdispersion parameter, equal to zero strongly rejects the null
hypothesis: thus, I can a¢ rm that overdispersion is present in the data, and
negative binomial distribution better ￿ts the data. Finally, a Vuong test of
ZINB versus NB suggests that NB is to be preferred.
17Figure 1 shows the observed and predicted probabilities for total intra-￿rm trade ￿ows.
The analysis with the other measures of intra-￿rm trade provides similar results, therefore the
other ￿gures are not reported.
18See Long and Freese (2005) p. 260.
11The last column of Table 3 presents the same model, estimated using OLS.
The dependent variable in this speci￿cation is log(flowict + 1). The coe¢ cient
estimate is close to the ones predicted using the other estimators. Neverthe-
less, the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.19
Monte Carlo simulations performed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2005) show
that estimates using log-linearized models are severely biased in presence of het-
eroskedasticity. Therefore, the log-linearized model is not a suitable choice, and
the negative binomial regression will be employed in the following analysis.
5.2 Results
I start the empirical analysis using as dependent variable total intra-￿rm trade
￿ ows running in both directions, from parent companies to foreign a¢ liates and
vice versa. Table 4 shows the results. In addition to the interacted term between
institutional quality at country level and institutional dependence at industry
level alone, I control for the impact of the two variables alone. The amount of
trade ￿ ows between parent companies and foreign a¢ liates can be a⁄ected by
the size of the parent company. One could expect that larger industries present
larger ￿ ows of intra-￿rm trade. Therefore, I control for the parent company size,
measured by total sales by parent companies included in the BEA data set.
Column (1) in table 4 shows that the institutional variable has a positive and
signi￿cant coe¢ cient, as expected. Thus, intra-￿rm trade ￿ ows are positively
a⁄ected by good levels of contract enforcement, especially in contract-intensive
industries. As expected, the coe¢ cient attached to the sales variable is positive
and signi￿cant. I control for market size, in order to test for the horizontal
type of FDI. I observe a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient, that con￿rms the
presence of a market seeking motive. Column (2) adds a number of controls for
vertical determinants of foreign direct investment. The measure of plant scale
economies has a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient. This con￿rms the idea
that opening a new plant is unfavourable in presence of plant scale economies.
Instead, the corporate scale variable has a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient,
suggesting that there is an incentive to the opening of subsidiaries in case of
this scale economies. I control for the role of the corporate tax rate. The
estimated coe¢ cient is not signi￿cant. Tari⁄s have a negative and signi￿cant
impact, as expected, while non-tari⁄ barriers to trade, proxied by a measure of
their coverage, show a coe¢ cient estimate that is not statistically di⁄erent from
19I also plot the residuals versus ￿tted values, observing a pattern between the two.
12zero. Freight and insurance costs have a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient.
Also Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2005) ￿nd that higher trade costs reduce
the demand for intermediate inputs shipped by U.S. parent companies to their
foreign a¢ liates.
In columns (3) and (4) I include classical determinants of comparative ad-
vantage. The coe¢ cient estimate for the institutional variable remains positive
and signi￿cant. Finally, column (6) includes both controls for vertical and hor-
izontal determinants of foreign direct investment. The coe¢ cient of interest
remains positive and signi￿cant. Table 4 reports the test for the hypothesis
that the overdispersion parameter, ￿, is equal to zero. The likelihood ratio test
always rejects the null hypothesis, thus showing again that the estimator to be
employed has to take into account overdispersion.
I decompose the total measure of intra-￿rm trade ￿ ows into its two compo-
nents: trade ￿ ows from the parent company toward foreign a¢ liates, and ￿ ows
of goods from the a¢ liate to the U.S. parent company.
Looking at trade ￿ ows running from a¢ liates to parent companies, I observe
that the institutional variable is generally positive albeit not signi￿cant across
di⁄erent speci￿cations presented in table 5. Control variables have the expected
coe¢ cients, and are generally signi￿cant.
Considering in turn trade ￿ ows from U.S. companies to foreign a¢ liates, I
obtain again a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient for the institutional variable.
Control variables for horizontal FDI always present a positive and signi￿cant
coe¢ cient. Table 6 shows the results.
Comparing the log likelihood across di⁄erent sets of estimates, I observe
that splitting the dependent variable into its two components improves the ￿t
of the estimates: log likelihood is always larger in absolute terms in estimates
presented in table 4, in comparison with results shown in tables 5 and 6.
I can decompose further my dependent variable. Trade ￿ ows from the U.S.
to foreign a¢ liates can be disentangled into ￿ ows of goods shipped for further
manufacturing, and ￿ ows of goods shipped to foreign a¢ liates for resale. I look
￿rst at trade ￿ ows of goods shipped for further manufacturing. I observe again
that the coe¢ cient attached to the institutional variable is positive and signi￿-
cant across the di⁄erent speci￿cations. This is an additional con￿rmation of my
hypothesis. I ￿nd that the choice of the multinational ￿rm in the fragmentation
of the production process is in￿ uenced by the comparative advantage given by
the good contract enforcement of the country in which the a¢ liate is located.
Of course, other country or industry characteristics may in￿ uence this choice.
13These have been controlled for in the alternative speci￿cations presented in table
7.
If I consider, ￿nally, the ￿ ows of goods shipped for resale, I observe that the
coe¢ cient for insti ￿ instc is generally not signi￿cant. Apart from market size,
also the other control variables generally show a coe¢ cient estimate that is not
signi￿cant. These results con￿rm the intuition that the contractual determinant
of o⁄shoring is not at work when considering goods that do not need further
manufacturing or, in other terms, ￿nal goods.
In order to assess the relevance of the institutional variable across di⁄erent
sets of estimates, I compute the marginal e⁄ects. Table 9 presents marginal
e⁄ects for the institutional variable across di⁄erent speci￿cations. The ￿rst line
shows the marginal e⁄ect when the dependent variable in the equation is the
amount of goods shipped from U.S. companies to foreign a¢ liates. The other
two lines present the marginal e⁄ects computed when the dependent variable
is the ￿ ow of goods shipped for further manufacturing, and the ￿ ow of goods
shipped for resale.
The marginal e⁄ects are larger that the estimated coe¢ cients when consider-
ing trade ￿ ows to foreign a¢ liates, and goods shipped for further manufacturing.
Looking at the marginal e⁄ects for the regressions on the goods for resale, I ob-
serve that they are much smaller is size that the coe¢ cient estimates, moreover
they are never signi￿cant. Thus, I can a¢ rm that the institutional variable im-
pacts on the choice of splitting the production between two countries, but has
a negligible impact when considering intra-￿rm trade ￿ ows of ￿nal goods.20
5.3 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
So far I have not inspected the time-varying dimension of my dataset. All
previous estimates pool together observations from two di⁄erent time periods.
As Greene (2001) suggests, given the short time period, one could simply add
time dummies to the model. Therefore, I reestimate the previous equations
adding a time dummy. Results do not change.21 Table 10 shows that the
inclusion of a set of country dummies, industry dummies or both does not change
the result that intra-￿rm trade is increasing in country￿ s institutional quality
and sector￿ s institutional dependence. It suggests also that it is important to
take into account these e⁄ects.
20The marginal e⁄ect is actually never statistically di⁄erent from zero.
21These estimates are not reported, but are available upon request.
14Thus, I move to panel estimates. My data vary over three dimensions:
country, sector and time. I choose as dimensions of my panel countries and
time. As regards the choice between ￿xed or random e⁄ects, I would a priori
choose ￿xed e⁄ects, as I could expect country or sector e⁄ects to be correlated
with the other regressors. Unfortunately, ￿xed e⁄ects estimator has a number of
shortcomings. It is not possible to obtain coe¢ cient estimates for time-invariant
regressors,22 as they are absorbed by the ￿xed e⁄ects. Groups in which trade
￿ ow does not change in time are dropped: given the short time span, only two
years, this is likely to occur.23 As my panel is unbalanced, all the group with
only one observation are dropped with ￿xed e⁄ects, but not with random e⁄ects.
Finally, Greene (2001) notes that as individual e⁄ects are estimated with T(i)
observations, a short time period implies a small sample bias and inconsistent
estimates for the e⁄ects.
In order to choose between ￿xed and random e⁄ects, I consider a baseline
speci￿cation using di⁄erent dependent variables, and perform a Hausman test.
Table 11 shows that coe¢ cient estimates are very close between ￿xed and ran-
dom e⁄ects. Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of absence of
correlation between individual e⁄ects and the other regressors, thus suggesting
that the e⁄ects should be considered as random.
Table 12 reports the baseline speci￿cation using di⁄erent dependent vari-
ables. These results con￿rm the ￿nding that the institutional variable has a
positive impact on intra-￿rm trade ￿ ows. The coe¢ cient of interest is posi-
tive and signi￿cant, both considering trade to foreign a¢ liates, and trade of
goods for further manufacturing. Instead, trade of goods for resale seems not
a⁄ected by the institutional quality variable: the coe¢ cient is now statistically
not di⁄erent from zero.
As a further robustenss check, I perform the panel estimates considering
sectors as my group variable. Table 13 shows that the results are not a⁄ected:
the institutional variable displays a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient.
Finally, I perform some sensitivity analysis. As all the analysis focuses on
the role of the institutional variable, I control re-estimating with alternative
measures of institutional quality at country, and industry level. The main con-
cern lies in the measure of institutional intensity at industry level. Indeed, as
22In my dataset, capital and skilled labour endowments are time invariant.
23Consider a country in which no FDI, and therefore no intra-￿rm trade, was present in 1994.
If no multinational start an FDI in the following ￿ve years, I will observe again an absence of
trade ￿ow for this country. In the panel ￿xed e⁄ect estimate, these two observations would
be dropped.
15regards institutional quality at country level, a number of valuable alternatives
are made available by the World Bank, in the Governance Matters Database.
Results with these alternative measures are robust.24
Institutional intensity at industry level is a rather vague concept, hardly
measurable. Presently, the most acknowledged measure is the one de￿ned by
Nunn (2007). Nonetheless the use of measures of concentration, like Her￿ndahl
index, as an indicator of product complexity is also recognized in literature.25
Table 14 reports the results obtained with Her￿ndahl index. Results do not
change, suggesting that the previous analysis is robust, and does not depend on
the speci￿c proxy adopted to measure institutional intensity.
Instead of limiting my analysis to standard measures used in literature, I de-
velop a number of alternative measures of concentration of intermediate input
use: entropy, normalized entropy, exponential index, Her￿ndahl index, normal-
ized Her￿ndahl index, Gini coe¢ cient, concentration coe¢ cient, share of top
10, 20 and 30 intermediate inputs in total intermediate good expenditure. I
use also the number of intermediates employed in the production. This is a
rawer measure of complexity of an industry, as it gives the same weight to large
and insigni￿cant inputs, ignoring di⁄erences in the entity of various inputs.26
Results are robust also when employing these alternative measures.
6 Conclusions
Classical determinants of foreign direct investments are the market access mo-
tive, and the cost reduction motive. On one side, the market seeking motivation
corresponds to the horizontal type of FDI. Usually, this corresponds to a FDI
in a developed economy, whose market is of interest to the multinational cor-
poration, which prefers to serve it with local production, in order to avoid the
costs associated with international trade. On the other side the cost reduction
motive correspond to the vertical FDI. This type of foreign investment is usually
directed to developing countries, whose market is less interesting for the multi-
national enterprise. The aim of this investment is to exploit the comparative
advantages of the countries in the production of goods. Thus, usually these
investments are located in developing countries with low labour costs.
Recently, several papers have proven that also the institutional environment
24Results are available upon request.
25See Blanchard Kremer (1997), Cowan Neut (2007) and Levchenko (2007).
26See Appendix A.2 for further details on how these variables are constructed.
16of the receiving country can in￿ uence the choice to establish an FDI in a foreign
country. Past literature has always considered institutional quality at country
level. The property rights theory suggests that contract enforcement matters
di⁄erentially across sectors, being more important for sectors that produce more
complex goods. This paper is the ￿rst attempt to test whether institutions
matter di⁄erentially across di⁄erent sectors in FDI decision.
Using data on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, I ￿nd that institutional char-
acteristics of the country and the industry positively a⁄ect the volume of o⁄-
shoring that takes place between U.S. companies and their a¢ liates. I ￿rst
consider total intra-￿rm trade ￿ ows, in both directions. Then I consider sepa-
rately trade ￿ ows from U.S. parent companies to foreign a¢ liates, and vice versa.
Finally, I exploit the di⁄erence between good shipped for simple resale in the
foreign market, and goods shipped for further manufacturing. I show that the
suggested argument is strong for the intermediate products, while the evidence
is weak for those products ready for sale. This con￿rms that the contractual
determinants of trade are not at work for these goods, whose production has
not been split between parent company and foreign a¢ liate.
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Tables
voice polstab goveff regqual rulelaw contrcorr
voice 1
polstab 0.75 1
goveff 0.76 0.83 1
regqual 0.71 0.77 0.89 1
rulelaw 0.74 0.88 0.94 0.84 1
contrcorr 0.76 0.83 0.95 0.84 0.96 1
All correlations are significant at 1% level
Table 1: Correlations between Di⁄erent Measures of Institutional Quality
22Variable Nobs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total intrafirm trade 655 563.52 4239.36 0 81829
Trade to U.S. parents 576 313.35 2378.82 0 44697
Trade to foreign affiliates 589 320.23 2151.56 0 37132
Further manifacturing 590 284.55 1870.35 0 35059
Resale 630 17.76 322.88 0 7990
















23Dep Var: Total intrafirm flows
Poisson ZIP NB ZINB OLS
insti*instc 6.90*** 6.79*** 7.76*** 7.92*** 6.43***
(.011) (.011) (.919) (.927) (.848)
constant 4.62*** 5.08*** 4.42*** 4.40*** 2.55***






Log Likelihood -846292 -692923 -2801 -2798
BIC 1688567 1381841 1590 1598
AIC 2703 2213 8.96 8.96
Specification Tests 1690356 5.75 1.7e+06 0.70







Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%
Table 3: Choice of the Estimator
24Dep. Var: Total intra-firm flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insti*instc 7.093*** 4.552* 7.413*** 8.348*** 9.048*** 6.368**
(2.28) (2.35) (2.54) (2.69) (2.58) (3.08)
instc 0.376 -0.0393 0.0890 0.377 -0.604 -0.363
(0.74) (0.80) (0.91) (1.08) (1.08) (1.27)
insti -1.176 -0.142 4.427** -4.753** -3.192 3.693
(1.44) (1.66) (1.82) (2.30) (2.29) (3.95)
sales 1.722*** 1.832*** -0.251 2.034*** 0.510 1.616**
(0.25) (0.48) (0.48) (0.32) (0.42) (0.67)
market size 1.143*** 0.928*** 1.118*** 1.184*** 1.201*** 1.020***
(0.086) (0.13) (0.099) (0.087) (0.096) (0.13)
tariff -0.0114** -0.0167***
(0.0049) (0.0057)
corp. scale 0.0295* 0.0537*
(0.016) (0.031)








capitali*capitalc -2.457 -5.782*** -8.592***
(1.54) (1.69) (2.11)
capitalc 1.969* 4.363*** 6.277***
(1.10) (1.18) (1.46)
capitali 38.33** 74.56*** 86.63***
(16.4) (17.9) (22.7)
skilli*skillc -53.83** -82.08*** -106.7***
(25.6) (29.1) (30.6)
skillc 3.567 6.481** 8.742**
(2.81) (3.05) (3.42)
skilli 57.74** 109.0*** 30.41
(23.2) (25.9) (47.3)
constant -47.03*** -40.67*** -52.70*** -55.51*** -97.58*** -106.4***
(3.83) (6.69) (12.1) (5.11) (14.7) (17.9)
LR test H0:α=0 1.4e+06 4.9e+05 1.3e+06 1.3e+06 1.3e+06 4.7e+05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 603 425 585 585 585 425
Log likelihood -2641 -2031 -2613 -2615 -2597 -2012
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Total Intra-￿rm Trade
25Dep. Var.: Intra-firm trade to U.S. parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insti*instc 3.506 1.347 5.252 1.412 4.347 -0.00853
(3.31) (3.39) (4.12) (4.05) (4.28) (4.48)
instc 2.603** 0.919 2.038 4.518*** 3.571* 3.752*
(1.10) (1.19) (1.55) (1.72) (2.03) (2.14)
insti 1.903 0.322 5.925** 0.857 0.603 14.92**
(2.08) (2.41) (2.59) (3.39) (3.35) (6.54)
sales 1.665*** 3.119*** -0.114 1.996*** 0.624 1.909**
(0.35) (0.82) (0.73) (0.46) (0.63) (0.97)
market size 1.060*** 0.816*** 1.044*** 1.147*** 1.208*** 1.169***
(0.12) (0.21) (0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.20)
tariff -0.0214 -0.0859***
(0.020) (0.027)
corp. scale -0.0233 -0.00223
(0.028) (0.053)








capitali*capitalc -1.615 -5.353** -13.31***
(2.38) (2.56) (3.38)
capitalc 1.254 3.726** 8.558***
(1.74) (1.86) (2.40)
capitali 28.45 68.79** 140.2***
(25.1) (27.3) (34.8)
skilli*skillc -31.61 -63.77 -185.9***
(34.0) (40.8) (45.9)
skillc -0.192 3.080 15.08***
(3.85) (4.44) (5.17)
skilli 32.51 83.94** 27.47
(30.7) (36.4) (66.5)
constant -46.48*** -52.24*** -46.16** -53.99*** -91.40*** -141.9***
(5.29) (11.3) (18.3) (7.02) (21.7) (28.0)
LR test H0:α=0 7.3e+05 2.6e+05 7.1e+05 6.9e+05 6.7e+05 2.4e+05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 526 365 509 509 509 365
Log likelihood -1683 -1296 -1672 -1668 -1662 -1272
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Intra-￿rm Trade to U.S. Parents
26Dep. Var.: Intra-firm trade to foreign affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insti*instc 7.029*** 4.255** 6.224*** 9.105*** 8.680*** 6.319**
(2.11) (2.14) (2.24) (2.50) (2.31) (2.94)
instc -0.465 -0.0639 -0.480 -0.960 -1.746* -1.382
(0.70) (0.74) (0.81) (0.95) (0.91) (1.19)
insti -2.112 -0.474 4.413*** -5.359** -2.885 2.966
(1.34) (1.54) (1.67) (2.21) (2.19) (3.70)
sales 1.635*** 1.065** -0.374 1.858*** 0.260 0.958
(0.24) (0.43) (0.41) (0.30) (0.39) (0.64)
market size 1.210*** 1.028*** 1.231*** 1.221*** 1.264*** 1.076***
(0.079) (0.11) (0.089) (0.083) (0.088) (0.12)
tariff -0.0108** -0.0126**
(0.0048) (0.0058)
corp. scale 0.0510*** 0.0532*
(0.014) (0.029)








capitali*capitalc -3.476** -5.693*** -6.109***
(1.42) (1.57) (1.81)
capitalc 2.705*** 4.379*** 4.778***
(1.00) (1.09) (1.28)
capitali 49.66*** 74.45*** 62.91***
(15.1) (16.6) (20.0)
skilli*skillc -43.59* -69.21** -74.70***
(25.3) (27.8) (28.9)
skillc 3.632 6.431** 6.896**
(2.69) (2.83) (3.12)
skilli 47.93** 99.19*** 20.59
(23.4) (25.0) (44.8)
constant -47.46*** -34.90*** -62.29*** -53.84*** -96.69*** -85.36***
(3.64) (5.73) (11.1) (5.07) (13.8) (15.7)
LR test H0:α=0 6.0e+05 2.3e+05 5.8e+05 5.7e+05 5.5e+05 2.2e+05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 541 381 524 524 524 381
Log likelihood -2315 -1788 -2281 -2295 -2271 -1778
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Intra-￿rm Trade to Foreign A¢ liates
27Dep. Var.: Goods for further manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insti*instc 7.221*** 5.830** 6.533*** 9.224*** 8.892*** 8.708***
(2.15) (2.28) (2.27) (2.49) (2.29) (3.00)
instc -0.620 -0.884 -0.630 -1.105 -1.949** -2.203*
(0.72) (0.80) (0.83) (0.95) (0.90) (1.23)
insti -2.147 -1.167 3.939** -5.982*** -3.910* -0.517
(1.37) (1.63) (1.69) (2.22) (2.19) (3.78)
sales 1.627*** 0.943** -0.257 1.912*** 0.432 0.867
(0.24) (0.43) (0.41) (0.30) (0.39) (0.64)
market size 1.179*** 0.999*** 1.207*** 1.196*** 1.246*** 1.024***
(0.079) (0.12) (0.091) (0.083) (0.090) (0.12)
tariff -0.0123** -0.0132**
(0.0050) (0.0061)
corp. scale 0.0511*** 0.0531*
(0.014) (0.029)








capitali*capitalc -3.459** -5.784*** -4.218**
(1.43) (1.57) (1.77)
capitalc 2.658*** 4.425*** 3.365***
(1.00) (1.09) (1.25)
capitali 48.74*** 74.91*** 43.54**
(15.2) (16.7) (20.3)
skilli*skillc -45.41* -70.01** -70.85**
(25.7) (28.3) (29.0)
skillc 3.704 6.426** 6.299**
(2.73) (2.88) (3.11)
skilli 53.78** 104.8*** 34.57
(23.7) (25.2) (46.3)
constant -46.57*** -32.44*** -62.03*** -54.18*** -98.66*** -69.32***
(3.65) (5.68) (11.2) (5.08) (13.8) (15.7)
LR test H0:α=0 5.3e+05 2.0e+05 5.2e+05 5.0e+05 4.9e+05 2.0e+05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 542 385 526 526 526 385
Log likelihood -2275 -1770 -2245 -2255 -2233 -1763
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7: Trade in Goods for Further Manufacturing
28Dep. Var.: Goods for resale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insti*instc 19.47*** 5.279 28.04*** 20.25 14.57 -12.09
(6.90) (6.74) (9.05) (12.6) (11.5) (12.7)
instc -1.675 1.958 -6.441 -7.504* -6.054 5.103
(2.82) (2.43) (4.21) (4.17) (4.24) (4.92)
insti -17.71*** -6.250 -9.005 -11.56 4.107 12.47
(5.50) (5.37) (8.13) (10.1) (10.2) (14.0)
sales 3.715*** -1.148 -0.758 2.137 -1.876 -1.447
(1.04) (1.43) (1.22) (1.50) (1.38) (2.20)
market size 2.658*** 2.576*** 2.398*** 2.578*** 2.490*** 2.913***
(0.50) (0.51) (0.44) (0.46) (0.44) (0.59)
tariff -0.0183 -0.0431
(0.042) (0.047)
corp. scale 0.183*** 0.199*
(0.037) (0.10)








capitali*capitalc 3.505 5.378 4.230
(5.15) (5.92) (5.82)
capitalc -1.485 -3.536 -3.719
(3.91) (4.54) (4.47)
capitali -8.325 -22.65 -48.76
(56.4) (63.8) (66.1)
skilli*skillc -66.78 121.7 210.4**
(117) (117) (101)
skillc 13.09 -4.708 -16.10
(11.1) (10.9) (10.00)
skilli -1.395 -117.9 -243.2
(105) (98.2) (164)
constant -113.3*** -59.77*** -56.65 -95.21*** -23.50 -5.554
(17.5) (20.5) (46.8) (23.6) (55.4) (50.0)
LR test H0:α=0 7.2e+04 9380.19 6.6e+04 3.5e+04 1.6e+04 5427.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 577 396 559 559 559 396
Log likelihood -299.1 -254.2 -290.5 -296.0 -287.4 -251.1
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8: Trade in Goods for Resale
29(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade to foreign af. 466.27*** 335.69* 384.69*** 642.14*** 489.71*** 444.05**
(147.02) (173.27) (143.34) (186.97) (138.58) (211.55)
Further manif. 446.43*** 419.55** 376.8*** 598.36*** 459.87*** 571.67***
(139.86) (171.04) (136.6) (171.77) (127.01) (208.69)
Resale 1.688 0.450 1.533 1.960 0.623 -0.733
(1.085) (0.623) (1.075) (1.636) (0.713) 0.688
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9: Marginal E⁄ects
30Dep. Var.: Intrafirm trade to foreign affiliates
(1) (2) (3)






Constant 4.41*** 2.51*** 2.93***
(0.641) (0.429) (0.59)
Observations 561 561 561
Dep. Var: Goods for further manifacturing






Constant 4.42*** 2.39*** 2.38***
(0.575) (0.43) (0.528)
Observations 562 562 562
Dep. Var: Goods for resale






Constant 4.07* -6.02*** -0.059
(2.17) (1.84) (1.71)
Observations 600 600 600
Country dummies Yes No Yes
Sector dummies No Yes Yes
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%;
 ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 10: Alternative Speci￿cations
31insti*instc 3.775*** 3.777*** 3.706*** 3.739*** 3.571 2.963
(0.99) (0.99) (0.99) (0.99) (3.72) (3.64)
insti -3.332*** -3.299*** -3.216*** -3.210*** -5.830** -5.348*
(0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (2.85) (2.75)
instc -0.739** -0.670* -0.855** -0.786** 0.852 -0.252
(0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.36) (1.49) (1.09)
sales 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.373*** 0.371*** 0.891** 0.874**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.35) (0.35)
market size 0.281*** 0.323*** 0.300*** 0.338*** 0.320 0.785***
(0.053) (0.051) (0.053) (0.050) (0.31) (0.16)
constant -11.87*** -13.02*** -12.64*** -13.68*** -22.33** -33.90***
(1.88) (1.82) (1.86) (1.81) (9.09) (5.97)
Log likelihood -1790 -2205 -1761 -2171 -160.3 -288.2
Estimation FE RE FE RE FE RE
Hausman test
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;
Estimates with country effects
(0.737) (0.484) (0.607)
















insti*instc 4.111*** 2.208 3.777*** 3.739*** 2.963
(0.98) (1.41) (0.99) (0.99) (3.64)
insti -3.251*** -1.156 -3.299*** -3.210*** -5.348*
(0.71) (1.04) (0.71) (0.71) (2.75)
instc -0.693** 0.612 -0.670* -0.786** -0.252
(0.35) (0.52) (0.35) (0.36) (1.09)
sales 0.334*** 0.335*** 0.349*** 0.371*** 0.874**
(0.099) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.35)
market size 0.324*** 0.411*** 0.323*** 0.338*** 0.785***
(0.049) (0.059) (0.051) (0.050) (0.16)
constant -13.10*** -16.91*** -13.02*** -13.68*** -33.90***
(1.74) (2.21) (1.82) (1.81) (5.97)
LR test vs pooled 334.79 184.74 297.13 277.91 37.59
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 603 526 541 542 577
Log likelihood -2509 -1566 -2205 -2172 -288.2
Panel estimates with country random effects. Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%










insti*instc 3.056*** 1.741 2.802** 2.950*** 1.865
(1.07) (1.51) (1.11) (1.10) (3.84)
insti -3.969*** -2.111* -4.071*** -4.166*** -4.983*
(0.78) (1.10) (0.80) (0.80) (2.89)
instc -0.261 0.797 -0.230 -0.408 0.530
(0.34) (0.52) (0.34) (0.35) (1.04)
sales -0.0240 0.0548 -0.0767 -0.0371 0.841**
(0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.34)
market size 0.500*** 0.548*** 0.526*** 0.527*** 0.727***
(0.037) (0.045) (0.037) (0.037) (0.11)
constant -13.70*** -17.51*** -13.48*** -13.89*** -33.39***
(1.66) (2.12) (1.74) (1.75) (5.20)
LR test vs pooled 129.36 40.64 132.44 129.6 8.2e-05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.496)
Observations 603 526 541 542 577
Log likelihood -2612 -1638 -2287 -2246 -307.0
Panel estimates with sector random effects. Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%










insti*instc 1.990* 0.597 2.282** 2.155** -0.867
(1.03) (1.47) (1.03) (1.04) (6.23)
insti -0.434 0.951 -0.842 -0.789 2.497
(0.73) (1.06) (0.70) (0.71) (4.98)
instc 1.531** 3.414*** 0.571 0.562 3.777
(0.65) (0.98) (0.62) (0.62) (3.30)
sales 2.320*** 2.551*** 2.059*** 2.047*** 3.200***
(0.24) (0.34) (0.22) (0.22) (1.06)
market size 1.139*** 1.161*** 1.197*** 1.158*** 2.426***
(0.083) (0.12) (0.078) (0.078) (0.43)
constant -54.47*** -59.93*** -52.61*** -51.52*** -106.6***
(3.79) (5.45) (3.53) (3.57) (15.5)
LR test H0:α=0 1.4e+06 7.5e+05 6.2e+05 5.4e+05 7.0e+04
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 603 526 541 542 577
Log likelihood -2650 -1688 -2321 -2282 -303.1
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




The data on intra-￿rm trade come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
surveys of U.S. direct investment abroad. Data are available annually from 1977
to 2004, but the data for benchmark years are more comprehensive. Benchmark
surveys (or censuses), are conducted every ￿ve years. They cover virtually the
entire population of foreign a¢ liates in terms of dollar value, and they obtain
more data items than are collected in the non-benchmark surveys. The BEA
conducts sample surveys in the non-benchmark years. These information are
reported in the annual time series. Reports are not required for small a¢ liates
in the sample surveys. Instead, BEA estimates the data for these a¢ liates by
extrapolating forward their data from the most recent benchmark survey on
35the basis of the movement of the sample data. Thus, coverage of the a¢ liate
universe is comparable in benchmark and non-benchmark periods. Some data
cells are suppressed in order to avoid disclosure of individual ￿rm data. These
are treated as missing values. In some other cells data are suppressed, but the
value suppressed is known to be between ￿$500;000 and $500;000. In this case,
I assign a value of $0. For a description of these data, see Mataloni (1995).
6.0.1 A.2 De￿nitions of Measures of Institutional Intensity
Nunn￿ s (2007) measure: Rauch classi￿es goods into three groups: goods
traded on an organized exchange (homogeneous goods), reference priced and
di⁄erentiated products, according to 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 system. I convert
this classi￿cation into 4-digit 1977 SIC and then to 4-digit 1987 SIC.27 I then
construct a concordance from the 4-digit 1987 SIC classi￿cation to the IO 1992
classi￿cation. The 1999 Input-Output table is more aggregated than the 1992
one, and has 69 input industries instead of 496. I aggregate the di⁄erent input
industries in the 1992 IO table in order to make the two comparable. Equal
weights are used when aggregating the 1992 IO Use Table to the 1999 IO level.
Finally, following Nunn (2007), I construct four measures of the proportion of







































where the ￿rst two adopt Rauch￿ s conservative classi￿cation, and the follow-
ing the liberal classi￿cation. ￿ij is the ratio of the value of input j in industry
i over the total value of all inputs used in industry i. Rneither
j is the propor-
tion of input j that is not sold on an organized exchange, nor reference priced,
while R
ref: priced
j is the proportion of input j that is reference priced. The four
27I use the concordances made available by Jon Haveman at
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman.
36measures show a Pearson correlation coe¢ cient of 0.99, signi￿cant at 1% level.
Concentration measures: I compute these indicators using the U.S. Input-
Output Table for 1992 and for 1999. All the measures, except entropy and the
number of intermediate inputs, increase with concentration. Then, I multiply
by -1 the measures, in order to have a set of indexes that increases with the
number of inputs, and therefore the number of contracts. These measures are
rescaled in order to span the [0;1] interval, with larger values corresponding to
higher contract intensity. The measures are de￿ned as follows:
Entropy: E = ￿
n P
i=1





Normalized Entropy: E0 = E
Emax = E
lnE where E is Entropy

















n ￿ H ￿ 1





where 0 ￿ H￿ ￿ 1
















Concentration coe¢ cient: C = n
n￿1G where G is the Gini Coe¢ cient
Share of top 10 intermediate inputs: S =
10 P
i=1
xi where xi are in decreasing
order




A.3 De￿nitions of Measures of Institutional Quality
Governance Matters IV Database (Kaufmann et al. 2005) provides six measures
of institutional quality. These are indexes that range from -2.5 to 2.5, with
low values corresponding to poor institutional quality. These indicators are
based on a huge amount of variables that measure the perception of government
quality, which belong to 37 separate data sources, constructed by 31 di⁄erent
organizations. These measures are:
Voice and Accountability: measures the level of political, civil and human
rights.
Political Instability and Violence: measures the likelihood of violent
threats to, or changes in, government, including terrorism.
Government E⁄ectiveness: measures the competence of the bureaucracy
37and the quality of public service delivery (the quality of public service pro-
vision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the
independence of civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the
government￿ s commitment to policies).
Regulatory Burden: measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies,
as for example price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as percep-
tions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign
trade and business development.
Rule of Law: measures the quality of contract enforcement, police, and
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. This is our preferred
variable as it refers speci￿cally to the quality of contract enforcement.
Control of Corruption: measures the exercise of public power for private
gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture.
B. Country List
The countries included in the analysis are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Ba-
hamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hun-
gary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Ko-
rea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rus-
sia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tai-
wan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, United Kingdom Islands Caribbean,Venezuela.
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